I study transactions between aircraft manufacturers and airlines as well as airlines' utilization of their fleet. Aircraft production is characterized by economies of scale via learningby-doing, which creates a trade-off between current profit and future competitive advantage in the aircraft market. The latter consideration makes large buyers more attractive than small buyers and induces quantity discounts. The resulting nonlinear pricing strategy may distort both production and allocation in favor of large buyers. There is a negative correlation between the size of aircraft orders and the per-unit price. There is also a positive correlation between the price paid and the utilization rate of the aircraft model, which suggests that the manufacturers' price discrimination leads to the misallocation of aircraft. To assess whether there is an inefficient allocation, I model the market and show that price discrimination by upstream firms may lead to an inefficient outcome compared with uniform pricing. Then, I construct and estimate a dynamic model of the aircraft market that includes a model of utilization. Finally, I conduct counterfactual simulations using the estimated parameters. I find that uniform pricing increases aircraft production by 10% and total welfare by 2.4%. * I am extremely thankful to Igal Hendel, David Besanko, Aviv Nevo, Rob Porter and seminar participants at Northwestern University for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Introduction
Most economic activities involve vertical relationships where upstream firms supply capital/intermediate goods to downstream firms and downstream firms supply final goods to consumers. In upstream markets, price discrimination is common and affects competition in downstream markets via capital allocation. Though price discrimination in upstream markets may have a large impact in both upstream and downstream markets, whether capital is efficiently produced and allocated in vertical relationships has been an open empirical question.
In this paper, I study the welfare consequence of price discrimination in the aircraft market using detailed data on aircraft transactions and aircraft utilization. The richness in the data allows me to study the connection between the vertical relationship in the aircraft (upstream) market and productivity in the airline (downstream) market. I construct and estimate a model of the industries in which competition and economies of scale in production lead to price discrimination in the aircraft market with higher discounts to larger buyers. The existence of quantity discounts may distort both production and allocation and leave room for improving social welfare from the policy maker's point of view. For a fixed production amount of aircraft, social welfare and productivity improve in the airline market with aircraft reallocation. Also, potential policy interventions, such as forcing manufacturers to post a uniform price, may induce more-intense competition and help restore efficiency in aircraft production.
To motivate the model, I first present a set of descriptive regressions. In the data, I find evidence that manufactures are exercising quantity discounts, in which airlines that buy large quantities pay less for each unit of aircraft. Also, I find evidence that airlines paying less for each unit utilize the aircraft less. The positive correlation between the price paid and the utilization rate suggests misallocation. The utilization rate indicates the marginal profitability or operational efficiency of the airline. From the social planner's point of view, more aircraft should be allocated to airlines with higher marginal profitability or higher marginal operational efficiency. On the other hand, the data suggest that aircraft are not allocated according to marginal profitability. Rather, the data suggest that airlines with lower marginal profitability face a lower aircraft unit price and, therefore, have easier access to the marginal aircraft, which causes inefficiency with misallocation.
One possible explanation for the source of inefficiency is the existence of economies of scale on the supply side. As pointed out in the existing literature, aircraft production is characterized by a learning-by-doing effect. The learning-by-doing effect creates a trade-off between the current profit and future intensity of competition. By lowering the current price aggressively, aircraft manufactures can attract more orders, which translates into a lower marginal cost in the future.
To lower future competition intensity, buyers with larger orders are more attractive than buyers with small orders. Serving a large buyer reduces the manufacturer's own future marginal cost through the learning-by-doing effect and, at the same time, takes away the opponent's opportunity to reduce the future marginal cost. This effect creates the incentive to strategically serve large buyers by offering a quantity discount. If the quantity discount is a consequence of supply-side factors, the allocation of aircraft may create inefficiency because a large buyer receives a more favorable price than a small buyer for the marginal unit, even though the small buyer is willing to pay more than the large buyer.
In this paper, I first construct a simple model to show that the existence of economies of scale together with competition among manufacturers may induce quantity discounts and misallocation.
The intuition of the result is simple. To reduce future competition intensity, manufacturers compete for the large buyer, which distorts both production and allocation. In the model, forcing uniform pricing increases both production and total welfare. By forcing uniform pricing, manufacturers do not compete by making a favorable offer to the large buyer but simply by producing more.
Intuitively, policy makers can force manufacturers to compete with equal intensity for all buyers, which may result in higher overall competition intensity and help increase total welfare. Indeed, if the good is capital, the model can explain the pattern in the data. Suppose the capital is used in final-good production where the production function is characterized by the amount of capital and the utilization rate. Also, suppose there is a cost associated with utilization. To maximize profit, final-good producers determine the amount of capital and utilization rate using the relative marginal factor price of capital and utilization. Therefore, final-good producers facing a lower price of capital substitute capital for utilization, and those facing a higher price do the opposite, which creates a positive correlation between the capital price and utilization rate.
In the estimation, I build a dynamic model with economies of scale in production and multidimensional heterogeneity-heterogeneity in profitability and ease of investment-in airlines, where manufacturers propose price menu as a function of product quantity and airline characteristics.
Manufacturers use the price menu to price discriminate among airlines and screen the ease of investment within airlines, which may create inefficiency.
The object of interest in the estimation is the parameter on the airlines' utilization model and the aircraft production model. The parameter on the utilization model and the heterogeneity in profitability among airlines are identified from the variation in the utilization rate. As Gavazza (2011) and other papers on capital productivity note, productivity and the capital utilization rate are closely tied and often indistinguishable. In the model, there is a one-to-one correspondence between profitability and the utilization rate, which allows for the identification of airlines' profitability from the data.
The supply-side parameter is identified from the pricing optimality and variation across time. By estimating the dynamic model of supply and demand, the static marginal cost of production is identified. Then, by relating the static marginal cost to cumulative production, the marginal cost, as a function of cumulative production, can be identified.
In the counterfactual analysis, I quantify the welfare loss caused by misallocation and evaluate the effectiveness of potential policy interventions. I find that forcing manufacturers to post a single uniform price increases aircraft production by 11% and total welfare by 2.4%, which suggests that the intuition from the theoretical example still holds in the structrual model of the industry. I also compare the result under "Grand Menu Pricing" regulation, where manufacturers are forced to post a price menu that only depends on the quantity but not on airline characteristics. "Grand Menu Pricing" allows manufacturers to price discriminate airlines by nonlinear pricing, which may incrase aircraft production by screening airlines in the dimension of ease of investment. In fact, I
find that "Grand Menu Pricing" regulation increases aircraft production by 10% and total welfare by 2.5%. This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, this study is related to the literature on input misallocation. Input reallocation has been understood as an important drive force of aggregate TFP growth. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate that about 30% to 60% higher aggregate TFP growth can be achieved by input reallocation. As is pointed out in the literature, one source of misallocation is input price dispersion.
1 In this paper, I study the implication of input price dispersion resulted from price discrimination in vertical relationships.
Another important literature that the paper contributes to is the literature on non-linear pricing and vertical relationships. The screening aspect of the non-linear pricing has been extensively studied. Stole (1995) shows that second degree price discrimination is sustainable even in a multifirm setting. There are number of papers including Rochet and Stole (2002) and Armstrong and Vickers (2010) that further explore the role of non-linear pricing under oligopoly. In contrast to the intense study of theoretical implication, little is known empirically. Busse and Rysman (2005) documents the relationship between competition and the curvature of the price-quantity menu.
Another important aspect of non-linear pricing arise in vertical relationships between upstream and downstream firms. The primary interest is to identify if the firms use non-linear pricing to avoid double marginalization. Villas-Boas (2002) establishes an estimation and inference method from market level data. However, the actual transaction data is still ideally needed to understand the precise structure of the market. Mortimer (2008) investigates the welfare implication of revenue sharing between upstream and downstream firms using the actual contracts in the video rental industry. In particular, this paper is closely related to the literature on the size-related buyers' purchasing power. There is a growing literature on the buyer-size effect on price discounts. A number of theoretical papers including Chipty and Snyder (1999) , Snyder (1996) and Gans and King (2002) shows the upstream competition may lead to quantity discounts. Ellison and Snyder (2010) empirically shows that buyer-size effect on price discounts appears only under upstream competition and there is no quantity discounts if the upstream firm is a monopolist. Sorensen (2003) studies the transaction price between hospitals and insurers, and identifies the buyer size as a source of the price discount. The findings in this paper are consistent with the literature.
Furthermore, I identify a new mechanism that induces quantity discounts and potential inefficiency.
The third strand of the literature to which this paper is related is the literature on the learningby-doing. The empirical study of the learning-by-doing starts in engineering as early as Wright (1936) in the aircraft production industry. The learning-by-doing effect attracted intense research interest in economics, too. Spence (1981) analyzes the theoretical aspects of the relationship between the learning curve and competition. Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) analyzes the market performance and strategic incentives in a model with a learning-by-doing effect. Cabral and Riordan (1994) analyzes the strategic incentive coming from the learning-by-doing effect in a differentiated good market where two firms compete by setting price, and shows the possibility of predatory pricing. In addition to the theoretical literature, there is a growing body of work on the estimation of the learning effects. Thornton and Thompson (2001) estimates the effect of the learning-by-doing in the wartime shipbuilding industry and Ohashi (2005) evaluates the efficiency gain from the government subsidy in the Japanese steel industry. Paired with the learning-bydoing, organizational forgetting also attracted economists' attention. Benkard (2000) , Levitt, List, and Syverson (2012) and Thompson (2007) , among other papers, find empirical evidence that there exists a learning-and-forgetting, and Benkard (2004) estimates a model for commercial aircrafts with dynamic aspects of the learning-and-forgetting. Besanko, Dorazelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010) conducts detailed analysis of the industry dynamics with a learning-andforgetting effect and concludes the existence of the learning-and-forgetting increase the incentive to price more aggressively than the industries without learning-and-forgetting. The theoretical and empirical literature on the learning-by-doing effect has emphasis on the production without any strategic role on the demand side, and the price is simply taken as uniform to all buyers. On the other hand, in the context of the aircraft market, the price dispersion is quite high and non-linear pricing seems to play an important role to explain the market structure.
This paper is also related to the empirical literature on dynamic models. Dating back to Ericson and Pakes (1995) , dynamic models has been developed by series of authors including Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) , Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) , etc.. I estimate the value function as a nonparametric function of the sate. The idea of estimating the value function as a nonparametric function is presented in Kalouptsidi (2010) . In contrast to Kalouptsidi (2010) , where the value function is estimated from price data of used ship, I estimate the value function by relying on the within period variation of players' investment decision.
Data

Basic Data Summary
The analysis presented in this paper is based on several different data sources: aircraft transaction data that occurred from 1978 to 1991, airlines' aircraft utilization data, data on characteristics of market participants and industry data book on production schedule, order history and delivery history.
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The first data set is constructed based on the Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration filings assembled by Avmark Inc.. DOT and FAA track histories of all commercial aircraft operating in the United States. During the sample period, they collected data on the aircraft transaction price, the aircraft serial number, and the buyer-seller identity. Table 1 summarizes the basic information contained in the data. In the data period, the main aircraft manufacturers are Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. Airbus increased its presence later and increased the competition intensity, which urged Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to merge in 1997.
During the data period, more than 5,000 aircraft were traded. About half of the transaction were made in the primary market where aircraft manufacturers trade with airlines, and the rest were made in the secondary market where airlines trade used aircraft each other. Though both primary and secondary markets seem equally active, there are a huge difference in the participants. 3 The main buyers in the secondary market are foreign airlines and cargo companies such as UPS and
FedEx, who buy used/old aircraft from domestic airlines. In the data period, the role of aircraft leasing was not as important as now. The fraction of leased aircraft in the airlines' fleet is more than 40% in 2013, but it is less than 2% in 1980. I constructed the remaining data set by combining a several different data source: Air Carrier Financial Reports, Jet Airliner Production List and data published on Boeing's website. After all combined, the data set contains basic financial characteristics of market participants and production schedules of each aircraft models. Table 2 summarize the basic information of the airline industries. The data period corresponds to just after the deregulation in airline industries which created aggressive investment/disinvestment behavior of airlines. Also, compared to 2010s, there are a lot more airlines in both major and regional business. In terms of the market share, most of the market is served by the major airlines despite of the large number of regional airlines. observation is airline-model-year level. Table 3 shows the basic statistics of the price and quantity data. The first row shows the price dispersion in the data. The variable is defined as the transaction price over the mean price of the same aircraft model. In the data, there are 2,457 transactions between manufacturers and airlines in total. The mean value is one by construction but the median value is less than 1, which suggests the existence of quantity discounts. The next two rows show the quantity dispersion. The variable in the second row is the airline-model level total transactions defined above and captures the purchase amount of the same aircraft model for each airline. The dispersion is quite large, where some airlines just purchase one or two of the same aircraft but some airlines purchase more than 30.
The third row shows the quantity dispersion denominated by the total production. The variable is constructed as the ratio of the variable in the second row divided by the total production in the same period, and captures the share of a airline in the same model. The dispersion still remains large. Some airlines have shares of less than 1% in a given model, but some airlines have shares of more than 30%. The data show that the airlines' purchase behavior is quite heterogeneous in both the price they pay and the quantities they buy. The unit of observation is each transaction for the first row and each airline-model pair for the second and third rows. "airline ratio" is defined as airline-model paired quantities divided by the total production during my sample period, and meant to capture the fraction of total production each airline accounts for. which is the best selling aircraft in the data period. Figure 1 shows the nonparametric mean regression result of the transaction price on the transaction year. The mean price is fairly stable over the year, but there exists notable dispersion within year. Similarly, figure 2 shows the relationship between airline ratio and the average unit price. There still exists dispersion in price, but figure 1 suggests that some part of the dispersion is explained by the dispersion in quantity. 
Descriptive Regression
In this subsection, I present evidence that suggests that (1) aircraft manufacturers price discriminate airlines and use non-linear pricing strategies; (2) the manufacturers price discrimination creates inefficiency in aircraft allocation and transportation production. For this purpose, I look at the relationship between the unit price of aircraft and order quantities in the order data and the relationship between the average unit price airline pays and the average annual utilization rate of the aircraft in the utilization data.
First, I present a negative correlation between the unit price and the order quantities to assess if (1) aircraft manufacturers price discriminate airlines and use non-linear pricing strategies. In order to analyze the correlation of these two variables, I use the data on transaction quantities and the payment at each order, and regress the unit price of aircraft on the quantity measure and other control variables. The regressions take the following form. For each unit price or price discounts at each aircraft order,
where y ijt is either p ijt , which is the unit price of the model j payed by airline i at time t, or d ijt , which is the discount ratio of transaction defined as mean price of model j−p ijt mean price of model j . q ijt is meant to capture the effect of quantities on the price and discount. I employed "airline ratio" and "order ratio" for this regression. The first variable is the same as in the third row of table 3 and the second variable is defined as model j stotal quantity airline i bargained at timet model j s total quantity produced . I employ the order fractions of total production rather than order quantities to normalize the effect of the quantity discount.
The total quantity produced vary from 34 to more than hundreds depending on the model and the same amount of purchase among different models may have different meaning depending on the production size. 7 x ijt includes variables such as observable characteristics of market participants, time fixed effect, model fixed effect, airline-manufacturer pair fixed effect, etc.. Table 4 shows the regression result of the unit price and the discount ratio. For each variable, the first row shows the estimates and the second shows the standard deviation. * * * represents 1% significance, * * represents 5% significance and * represents 10% significance. Only subset of variables are reported in the table.
The coefficients on both the airline ratio and order ratio suggest there exist quantity discounts.
Introducing seller×buyer dummy increase the number of regressors remarkably, which causes the loss of significance of the coefficient on airline ratio. But the sign itself stays the same.
Asset, domestic revenue and international revenue are characteristics of buyers. Company size of buyers measured by their asset size does not have any significant effect on the price they pay.
The regression result on a few other variable may suggest the nature of the market. First, the coefficient on "cumulative ratio", which is defined as model j stotal quantity produced up to time t model j s total quantity produced , has a significant effect to reduce the price of the aircraft. This result may suggest that there is a learning-by-doing effect where cumulative production experience decreases the marginal cost of production. Also, the "rival availability" 8 has a significant effect to reduce the price, which suggests manufacturers face competition and the competition translates into the price reduction.
In the next set of regressions, I show the positive correlation between the price paid and the utilization rate to assess if (2) the manufacturers' price discrimination creates inefficiency in aircraft allocation and transportation production. In order to analyze the correlation, I regress the average 7 Instead of using denominated quantity, I also run the same regression on the actual quantity. The results are qualitatively the same. This table reports the estimated coefficients of the OLS regression of the unit price and the discount ratio. The dependent variable is the unit price at the order in the first two columns and the discount ratio for the last two columns. The unit of observation is a aircraft order which consists of the order quantity and total payment. The unit price is defined as the total payment divided by the order quantity. The discount ratio is defined as the mean price of the same model aircraft minus the unit price divided by the mean price. "asset" represents the asset size of the airline, "domestic revenue" represents the airlines' flight revenue in the domestic routs, "intel revenue" represents the airlines' flight revenue in the international routs, "cumulative ratio" represents the cumulative production fraction at the time the order was made and "rival availability" represents a dummy variable that takes 1 if there was any other similar aircraft model available.
annual utilization rate of each model on the price paid and other control variables. The regressions take the following form. For each annual utilization rate of each aircraft model,
where u ijt is either the average utilization hours, which is defined as the airline i's average hours of operation of model j at time t, or the average utilization rate, which is the average utilization hours of airline i over the average utilization hours of all airlines within the same model. p ijt is meant to capture the effect of the price paid. I employ two variables for p ijt ; the mean price airline i paid to model j over the overall mean price paid to model j, and discount ratio of airline as defined above. y ijt includes the same control variables as x ijt does in the previous set of regressions. Table 5 shows the regression results. The results show positive and significant correlation between the price paid and the utilization rate, which suggest a positive correlation between the price paid and airlines' willingness-to-pay. If all airlines faces the same marginal cost of operating aircraft, then airlines having a higher marginal profitability will operate the aircraft more intensively. And as a result, airlines' marginal willingness-to-pay to the aircraft and the average utilization rate will have positive monotonic relationship. Thus, the results in table 5 suggest that airlines with higher marginal willingness-to-pay are facing higher marginal price, which also suggest misallocation of aircraft.
Interpretation of the Descriptive Results
The data suggest that (I) there is dispersion in price within the same period; (II) manufacturers price discriminate airlines and use non-linear pricing strategies; (III) the manufacturers price discrimination creates inefficiency in aircraft allocation and transportation production. Table 3 and figure 3 provide direct evidence of price dispersion in the aircraft market and table 4 and figure 4 provide evidence that aircraft manufacturers price discriminate airlines and use non-linear pricing strategies. To be precise, to argue that the manufacturers use non-linear pricing strategies, I need to provide the counterfactual price as a function of the quantity rather than showing a negative correlation between the price and quantities. Since I only observe the transaction This table reports the estimated coefficients of the OLS regression of the average utilization hours and the average utilization rate. The dependent variable is the average utilization hours in the first and the third columns and the average discount ratio for the second and fourth columns. The unit of observation is an annual utilization hours of each aircraft model in each airline's fleet. The average utilization hours are defined as the total utilization hours of each aircraft model divided by the number of the same model aircraft in each airline's fleet. The average utilization rate is defined as the average utilization hours divided by the industry average utilization hours of the same aircraft model. "fleet" represents the number of aircraft that was in the airline's fleet and "asset" represents the asset size of the airline.
price and quantity that actually happened rather than the complete menu of the price-quantity relationship, the correlation can be always rationalized by a linear pricing strategy with transaction specific slopes. However, it is a known fact that order quantities are an important factor to get discounts when manufacturers and airlines negotiate over the price.
9 Table 5 provide evidence that (III) the manufacturers price discrimination creates inefficiency in aircraft allocation and transportation production. Ideally, to provide direct evidence of misallocation, I need to present that there is dispersion in marginal productivity of aircraft across airlines.
However, marginal productivity of aircraft is difficult to measure. Instead, I use the utilization rate as the indicator for marginal productivity, which is a standard proxy in the capital utilization literature. For example, there is one-to-one correspondence between airlines' productivity and the utilization rate in Gavazza (2011) . 10 An important assumption behind is that the marginal cost of utilization is increasing. When airlines decide the utilization rate, they equate marginal cost of utilization to the marginal productivity. If the marginal cost of utilization is increasing, a high utilization rate implies a high marginal cost and, therefore, high marginal productivity.
If we believe that the utilization rate is a good indicator for the marginal productivity, table 5
suggests that the manufacturers' price discrimination creates inefficiency in aircraft allocation and distorts production of transportation. From social planner's point of view, more aircraft should be allocated to airlines with high marginal productivity. However, the data suggest that airlines with low utilization rate, therefore low marginal productivity, face lower price and have easier access to the marginal aircraft, which creates misallocation of aircraft. The aircraft misallocation creates welfare loss in airline market by creating inefficiency in production of transportation.
Model
The results in the previous section raise the following questions: Why is the misallocation sustained in the equilibrium? How much is the welfare loss coming from the misallocation? To answer the questions, I take a structural approach in the subsequent sections of the paper.
To start the analysis, I describe the model of the aircraft transactions and utilization in this section.
Theoretical Example
Before moving to the full model that I estimate structurally, I describe a simple theoretical example to derive intuition for why there is allocative inefficiency and how we can restore the welfare loss by potential policy interventions. To start with, I present a model of upstream firms and downstream firms without any utilization part.
Upstream
Suppose two ex-ante identical firms, U 1 and U 2, sell a homogeneous intermediate good in two periods. The marginal cost of production is constant within each period, but exhibits dynamic economies of scale via a learning-by-doing effect. Let the marginal cost of production be
where q it−1 is the cumulative production amount of firm i up to period t − 1, and k captures the Game Structure
The timing of the pricing and purchase decision is the following. 3. Each downstream firm decides how much to buy the good given the offered price and receives utility from consumption minus the price she pays.
Period 2
The same structure repeats.
To simplify the analysis and to avoid complication coming from a tie, assume downstream firms choose to buy from U 1 if the same price is offered.
Proposition 1: There is an equilibrium with quantity discount in the first period.
Proof: In Appendix.
The intuition behind the proposition is simple. The learning-by-doing effect creates ex-post market power in the second period. If one upstream firm produce more in the first period, the firm has lower marginal cost than its rival and earns profit by undercutting its rival's marginal cost.
Given this ex-post market power, upstream firms compete in the first period to produce more.
Suppose that there are two downstream firms in the first period and also suppose the downstream firms are heterogeneous in their demand for the intermediate good, the downstream firm with larger demand is more attractive since serving the larger downstream firm increases production more and determines which upstream firm will have the market power in the second period.
Therefore, competition between upstream firms lead to competition for the larger downstream firm, which results in a quantity discount. Under the equilibrium with quantity discounts, the smaller downstream pays more than the long-run marginal cost and the upstream firm earns longrun profit. However, the long-run profit is extracted by the larger downstream firm as a result of competition between upstream firms and she receive lower price than the smaller downstream firm. The dispersion in the marginal price creates allocative inefficiency. Also, if the downstream firms in the example use the good to produce final goods, then this example can also explain the positive correlation between the price paid and utilization rate.
Also it is notable that forcing uniform pricing increases total production and total welfare in the example. The intuition behind the result is the following. If price discrimination is possible, upstream firms compete by making offers to large buyers as favorable as they can, which distort both production and allocation. By forcing to offer a single price to every consumer, upstream firms compete by setting the price as low as they can, which increases production and the producer surplus made in the second period. As a result, the total welfare increases.
The observed pattern in the data is consistent with the theoretical example, which evokes a need for structural estimation as a natural next step of this paper. The example suggests that there is inefficiency in both allocation and production, which can be partly restored by potential policy interventions. To quantify the welfare loss and the effectiveness of the potential policy interventions, I construct and estimate a dynamic model of the aircraft transactions and the airlines' fleet utilization in the subsequent sections.
Timing and Game Structure
Time, indexed by t, is discrete and infinite. At every t, each manufacture, indexed by j, announce the price schedule of its products, indexed by m ∈ M j , as a function of quantity and airline characteristics. At each period, airlines, indexed by i, utilize their current fleet, and at the end of the period they choose their fleet for the next period given the price schedule of the aircraft.
The timeline of the model at each period is the following: respectively. Also, at every t, airline i faces a residual demand function given the utilization decision of all other airlines. Airline i faces the following inverse demand curve
where Q l is airline l's total utilization hours, d t is the time specific profitability of unit utilization hour at period t and γ i is the airline specific profitability of utilization.
The utilization decision of each airline is static and airlines compete by the utilization hours given their fleet. Additional to the aircraft each airline owns, airlines can operates aircraft leased form financial companies. Let r m t denote the rental cost of an aircraft at period t and l m it denote the number of aircraft that airline i rents at period t. Here I assume the leasing market and the used aircraft market is competitive and the rental price is determined exogenously. Then the best response function of airline i given Q −i can be defined as
where
) denotes a vector that counts i's number of the rental choice of aircrafts.
) denote the vector that represents airline i's fleet in the subsequent section in this paper.
Since airlines simultaneously decide their utilization hours, Nash equilibrium is characterized as the fixed point of the best response function. The profit each airline derive at each period in equilibrium is
Investment Decision
Let π t i (F t ) be the expected profit of airline i at period t in the equilibrium of the game described above as a function of airlines' fleet F t = (F 1t , · · · , F It ). Suppose airline i is expecting the sequence of airlines' fleet {F −it } ∞ t=s and the sequence of aircraft pricing menu {p t (q, γ) =
t=s . Airline i maximizes the expected discounted sum of the future profit defined as follows:
is a model specific idiosyncratic shock on the cost of investment and δ f it is the depreciation rate of aircraft. By the recursive structure, airline i's investment strategy can be characterized as a maximization problem of the following object. At each period, airline i's
Aircraft Production and Pricing
In this subsection, I describe the model of aircraft production and manufacturers' pricing strategy. Note that the production experience exhibits "learning-and-forgetting", which is a common phenomenon in capital production. 12 Under the production environment, the period profit of the manufacture j can be described as follows. Suppose manufacturer j is expecting the airlines' investment strategy, σ, the sequence of air-
, and the sequence of aircraft pricing menu of its rival manufacturer, {p −jt (q, γ)}.
Manufacturer j maximizes the expected discounted sum of the future profit defined as follows. Now, let p jt (q, γ, E t , F t ) denote the price menu manufacture j propose given the state of manufacturers and airlines. The value function of manufacturer j is defined as
where q t and the evolution of state E t are induced from the investment strategy of airlines and its rival's pricing strategy. By the recursive structure, manufacturer j's pricing strategy can be characterized as a maximization problem of the following object. At each period, manufacturer j's strategy is,
Solution Concept
To close the model, I use Oblivious Equilibrium as the solution concept in this paper. Oblivious Equilibrium(OE) is a solution concept proposed by Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2008) , in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the longrun average industry state, but not on the current information about competitors' states. OE is convenient in industries with many firms, and Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2008) provides reasons to use OE as a close approximation to Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE).
In this paper, I make the following two assumptions. (1) The most related paper to these assumptions is Benkard, Jeziorski, and Weintraub (2013) , where the authors develop an application of OE to to concentrated industries. In the paper, the authors define an extended notion of oblivious equilibrium, Partially Oblivious Equilibrium (POE), in which the state of a subset of players enter into the players' strategies. Since players ignore the actual state of all other players in OE, POE is a generalization of OE in the sense that the players take the actual state of some of the players into account. Since there are more than thirty airlines in the data, the dimension of the state variables is too large to solve the model using Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Adopting OE (POE) makes the model tractable and feasible to estimate.
Assumption 1. Airlines play Oblivious strategy. When airline i makes its investment decision, it bases its decision only on its own fleet, current proposed pricing menu and the long-run average industry state. In particular, when airline i takes expectation of expression
Also, since there are a large number of airlines, assuming players are oblivious of the actual state of airlines may work as a good approximation of MPE.
Estimation and Identification
In the estimation, I take three steps to estimate the whole model. 
Utilization Model
I specify the inverse demand curve as follows. Since major airlines and regional airlines shows different patterns in the utilization, I allow the parameter to take different values between these two types of airlines.
The inverse demand function takes the following form if airline i is a major airline
and if airline i is a regional airline
where γ captures the airline specific profitability of utilization and d t captures the time specific demand sifter. Also, I specify the cost of utilization as
where κ captures the increasing marginal cost of utilization and m it is independent across time, model and airlines.
Assumption 3 (Distributional of the Shock on the Utilization Cost). s are distributed identically
and independently as N (0, σ 2 ).
Assumption 4 (Distribution of the Demand State). d t s are distributed identically and independently as
The parameter to be estimated is One important missing information is the rental cost aircraft, which I estimate using the data on the transaction price of used aircraft. This assumption allows me to estimate the rental cost of aircraft. In the data, I observe the transaction price of aircraft, which is informative about the cost of holding an aircraft for one year.
Assumption 5 (Leasing Market
Suppose a leasing company buy an aircraft at year t and sell it at t+1, the difference in the aircraft price at t and t + 1 is the rental cost of the aircraft under the assumption of competitiveness. In the subsequent analysis, I substitute the estimated rental price in the estimation of the utilization model parameter. 13 The parameter is identified from the variation in the utilization rate and the variation in rental choice. For a fixed fleet, airlines equate the marginal cost and the marginal revenue of utilization. The variation in the utilization rate identifies the relative value of the parameter of utilization cost and profitability. For example, the relative value of d t and γ i s are identified from the relative level of utilization rate across airlines and time. Conditional on the fleet, the variation in utilization rate across airlines identifies the relative level of γ i , and the variation in overall utilization level across year identifies that of d t . The rental choice identifies the absolute level of the parameter.
The optimal utilization hours of airline i satisfies
This equality conditions translate into a set of moment equality, which is
The absolute value of the parameter and c 0 is identified from the optimality of the rental choice.
The cost increasing (benefit of decreasing) the observed rental choice can not be larger than the decrease (increase) in the per unit utilization cost, which identifies the fixed cost, c 0 , and the absolute value of the parameter. The rental decision of airline i satisfies the optimality condition 13 In the estimation of the rental price, I first estimate the used aircraft price nonparametrically for each model, m, and year, t. I specify the estimation equation as
where l is a index for transactions, p m lt is the observed transaction price of model m aircraft that is age lt year old and ε m lt is meant to capture measurement error. Gavazza (2011) notes that the actual transaction price is explained well by the list price, which is calculated by the age of the model. The rental price is estimated by
where age lt is the average age of the model m used aircraft traded at time t and β is the discount factor. Here I set the discount factor to be 0.95.
This inequality conditions translate into a set of moment inequality conditions for the parameters.
I estimate the parameter by minimizing the objective function which has both the above equality and inequality conditions.
Investment Decision
First, I specify the distribution of the shocks on investment cost.
Assumption 6 (Distributional Assumption on the Error). ηs are distributed identically and independently as
At each period, airline i maximizes the value function given the proposed price menus and the period shock on investment cost. In the maximization problem, {p s q is , γ i } can be backed out from the data. Therefor the only dynamic part to be estimated is the value function. With the distributional assumption on η, the optimality of the airlines' fleet choice induces the likelihood of the data.
I take two steps in the estimation of the value function. In the first step, I estimate the manufacturers' pricing menus nonparametrically. In the second step, I substitute the estimated pricing menus in the likelihood function and estimate the value function nonparametrically by sieve MLE.
From the optimality of the airline i's investment decision,
If the price menu is observed, the condition above translates into conditions on the range of η is .
From the optimality condition, changing q is to q is + 1 or q is − 1 gives,
Therefore, the probability of observing q is in the data is equal to
By approximating the value function by a sieve function, I can estimate the parameter on the sieve function by MLE. However, this approach is not feasible because the price menu is not observed and, therefore, a two step approach is needed.
In the data, I observe (p m it , q m it , γ i ) for each aircraft order, which allows me to estimate the price menu nonparametrically. In the first step, I estimate the pricing menu using the following specification.
For each t,
where e mit is independent with q m it and γ i .
14 Here e mit is meant to capture measurement error in the data. By approximating p m t by a sieve function and substituting γ i for γ i , the price menu can be estimated by a standard nonparametric regression method.
In the second step, I substitute p m it and γ i for p m it and γ i in the expression (3), which induces the 14 Under the model, the price menu is a function of the state and it should be estimated as a function of the state rather than than an independent function for each t. However, the state of manufacturers is not observed since the depreciation rate of the experience, δ, is unknown and it is infeasible to estimate it as a function of the state. One alternative estimation strategy is to jointly estimate the production side parameter, but it is computationally demanding. In order to estimate the airlines' value function, a consistent estimator of the price menu for each t is sufficient.
likelihood of the data as
As long as p s and γ i are consistent for p m it and γ i , the probability in expression (3) and (4) 
Aircraft Production
In this subsection, I describe the estimation of the aircraft production parameter. First, I specify the production technology as follows.
where ζ, ρ and δ is the parameter to be estimated.
The estimation relies on simulations similar to Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) .
denote the expected discounted sum of the future profit of manufacturer j when manufacturers play strategy σ p . The optimality of the observed pricing menu gives the following inequality conditions.
Given the estimated value function of airlines, I can simulate the transaction outcome for arbitrary pricing menus. Therefore, I can simulate both left and right hand side of the inequality, which construct a set of inequality conditions. I assume that the production parameter is identified by the inequality conditions and the parameter can be estimated similar to the method proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) . A notable difference from Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) comes from the fact that the exact state is not observed in my model. Even though I see the 15 In the estimation, I approximate the objective by a polynomial function of its argument.
complete history of the aircraft production history, the exact state is a function of the depreciation rate of the experience, δ, and the production history. 
Result and Counterfactual
In this section, I present the estimation and counterfactual result. Table 6 shows the main estimates of the parameter. κ captures the increasing part of the marginal cost of utilization. Since the marginal cost of utilization is increasing, the dispersion in the utilization rate implies the welfare loss. For any fixed amount of total utilization hours, the total utilization cost is minimized when the utilization rate is equalized among airlines. In the aircraft production, ζ captures the production cost that goes to 0 as the manufacturers' experience goes to infinity. The learning-by-doing accounts for up to about 30% of the total cost of production. Compared to the existing literature, the estimates are in a reasonable range. Benkard (2000) reports the forgetting rate to be about 61% and the effect of the cost reduction to be about 40%.
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In the counterfactual analysis, I compare the equilibrium market outcome and welfare under two alternative market designs: the manufacturers post a single uniform price to all airlines for each of their products (Uniform Pricing); the manufacturers post one price-quantity menu to all airlines for each of their products (Grand Menu Pricing). The first counterfactual analysis is The advantage and disadvantage of the act has been extensively studied 17 and this counterfactual analysis provides an additional view on this topic by assessing the market outcome and welfare under a situation where all downstream firms have access to the same price menu. Table 7 shows the counterfactual equilibrium outcome compared to the current situation. The 17 Though it is an important regulation to maintain fair competition, the Robinson-Patman act has been rarely effective recently. See Luchs, Geylani, Dukes, and Srinivasan (2010) for a detailed summary. first half of the table shows the counterfactual outcome under the uniform pricing regulation. By forcing uniform pricing, the average price of aircraft decreases and the production amount increases for both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. The increase in aircraft production results in more total utilization hours and lower utilization rates. Since the marginal cost of utilization is increasing and the average aircraft price has decreased, airlines buy more aircraft and decrease the utilization rate, which ends up in lower the utilization rate. Similar patterns are reported in the second half of the table 7. The second half reports the equilibrium outcome under the grand menu pricing regulation. Under the grand menu pricing, manufacturers can still sort airlines by proposing non-linear pricing menu, but manufacturers need to offer the same menu to all airlines. Since the menu can be non-linear, the pricing can creates dispersion in the marginal price. However, allowing a non-linear pricing has, at least, two advantages over uniform pricing. Under uniform pricing regulation, both upstream firms and downstream firms suffer from double-marginalization, which may be mitigated by allowing non-linear pricing. Also, non-linear pricing helps upstream firms to screen downstream firms in the dimension of unobserved demand size. It is theoretically known that, under the existence of asymmetric information in buyers' demand, allowing sellers to design non-linear pricing to screen the buyers helps to increase production. These two positive effect on aircraft production offset the inefficiency coming from dispersion in marginal price. The important take away from table 7 is that both counterfactual results suggest that the important point to improve market performances is to treat all market participants equally. Table 8 shows the counterfactual welfare change under uniform pricing and grand menu pricing.
In both cases, manufacturers faces higher competition intensity and decreases their price on average. However, the manufacturers' profit is almost unchanged. Higher competition intensity leads to lower revenue per unit sales but, at the same time, it increases total production and leads to lower unit costs via the learning-by-doing effect. In terms of welfare, higher competition intensity leads the price closer to the long-run marginal cost of production, which helps to restore efficiency.
As in the previous table, the counterfactual results are similar in both uniform pricing and grand menu pricing cases, which again suggests ensuring a fair competition environment is important to help the market mechanism to work well.
Conclusion
In this paper, I present evidence that suggests capital misallocation in aircraft and airline industries.
I present a simple theoretical example to show that the learning-by-doing effect in production and competition among upstream firms lead to aircraft price discrimination. The existence of economies of scale in production creates a incentive to treat large buyers better, which distorts both production and allocation of aircraft in favor of large buyers. I further construct and estimate a dynamic structural model of the industries. The model captures economies of scale in aircraft production via a learning-by-doing effect and both second and third degree price discrimination in aircraft market. Using the estimated parameter, I simulate the equilibrium outcome under alternative pricing regulations. The result suggests that manufacturers' ability to price discriminate airlines results in lower production of aircraft and lower total welfare. Forcing manufacturers to treat all airlines equally does not only ensures fair competition in the airline industry but also increases efficiency in both aircraft and airline industries.
rate. Suppose the production function and cost function are given as follow: This equation implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence and a positive relationship between the price offered and utilization rate. The intuition is simple. When downstream firms make their production decision, they take two factor prices into account; the price of capital and the cost of utilization. If a downstream firm is offered a lower price of capital, the relative price of capital become lower and, therefore, buys more capital and decreases the utilization rate.
Full Example with Arbitrary Contracting with Externalities among Downstream Firms.
Upstream Firm
Suppose two ex-ante identical upstream firms, U1 and U2, sell a homogeneous intermediate good in two periods. The marginal cost of production is constant within each period, but exhibits dynamic economies of scale via learning-by-doing effect. Let the marginal cost of production be
where q t is the cumulative production amount up to period t, and k captures the degree of learningby-doing.
Downstream Firm
At each period, downstream firms arrive at the market. Given a total production amount of the intermediate good, the social planner allocates the intermediate good to maximize total welfare. Since the total welfare can be described as 
Equilibrium with Arbitrary Pricing Menu
By backward induction.
2nd Period
Let Q 1 and Q 2 be the production quantity of U 1 and U 2 in the 1st period. Let Q 1 > Q 2 .
The following consists an equilibrium.
1. U 2 propose a simple linear pricing menu p(q) = q × (c u − kQ 2 ) to both downstream firms.
2. U 1 propose (1) a simple linear pricing menu p(q) = q × (c u − kQ 2 ) to D4 and (2) two part tariff p(q) = F 2 (Q 1 , Q 2 ) + q × (c u − kQ 1 ) to D3, where
In the equilibrium, the dominant upstream firm produces all the intermediate good. Since the dominant upstream firm has lower marginal cost, it can always undercut the rival's price. In the downstream market, D3 act as if its marginal cost is c u − kQ 2 and D4 act as if its marginal cost is c u − kQ 1 . Since U 1 makes the menu to maximize industry profit and tries to extract it all by two part tariff, U 1 under-supply to D4. And U 1 sets the marginal price equals to the true marginal cost to D3 so that D3 maximize the profit in the downstream market. However, the amount of the profit that U 1 can extract is constrained by the fact that both downstream firms can deviate from U 1's menu and by the intermediate good from U 2. The maximum amount of profit that U 1 can extract is defined by F 2 (Q 1 , Q 2 ).
1st Period Given the analysis above, I next explain the equilibrium in the first period. First, let me describe the equilibrium.
1. U 1 propose (1) simple linear pricing menu p(q) = qc u to D2 and (2) non-linear pricing p(q) = qc u − F 2 (q * 1 + q, 0) to D2, where q * 1 is the equilibrium quantity D1 chooses.
2. U 2 propose the same price-quantity menu as U 1.
The equilibrium pricing maximizes the industry profit subject to the fact that one of the upstream firms can always supply the intermediate good to downstream firms at the cost of c u . Since downstream firms favor U 1, in equilibrium, one upstream firm (U 1) produces all the intermediate good and designs the menu to maximize the joint surplus of U 1 and the downstream firms.
